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ABSTRACT 
This study sought to examine the value of modus operandi (MO) information in the investigation 
of short-term insurance fraud. A comprehensive literature study was conducted concerning the 
dynamics of MO information in forensic investigation and short-term insurance fraud in South 
Africa and internationally, and individual semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
forensic investigators at Santam and MiWay to promote knowledge and understanding of the 
importance of MO information in short-term insurance fraud investigations.  
Results of this research indicate that participants did grasp the significance of MO information in 
the investigation of short-term insurance fraud. It is, however, apparent that they did not optimally 
exploit MO information regarding insurance fraud as a result of limited experience, ineffective 
databases and the inaccessibility of available data – all of which prevent the improvement of 
utilising MO data pertaining to short-term insurance fraud. Forensic investigators in the short-
term insurance industry isolate themselves from each other and fail to share the available MO 
information amongst each other, resulting in a non-systematic fragmented approach to short-term 
insurance fraud investigation. The study identifies the challenges and shortcomings experienced 
by forensic investigators at Santam and MiWay that prevent the optimal utilisation of MO 
information in the investigation of short-term insurance fraud. The study then suggests a set of 
recommendations that could assist forensic investigators and other role-players in enhancing the 
utilisation of such information. 
Key terms: Modus operandi, short-term insurance, short-term insurance fraud, false claim, 
inflated claim. 
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CHAPTER 1  GENERAL ORIENTATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Modus operandi (MO) information has been used successfully during the investigation of all 
types of crimes, for example, murder, burglaries and rape. “Knowledge of the modus operandi 
of criminals and methods of their apprehension skill, patience, tact, industry, and thoroughness 
… will be everlasting primary assets in detective work” (O’Connell & Soderman, 1936:1). The 
use of MO information during the investigation of fraud within the short-term insurance industry 
is becoming increasingly important. By following the MO of criminals, important investigative 
leads can be obtained to support the investigation by linking fraudsters or syndicates to many 
other crimes. 
Turvey (2002:229) emphasises the importance of proper examination of MO for the following 
reasons: 
 linkage of unsolved cases; 
 suspect identification; 
 development of investigative leads; and 
 suspect prioritisation or elimination. 
Gragido and Pirc (2011:120) state that with the technological advancements in recent times, a 
spike in cybercrime has been evident. Cybercrime entails criminal activity that targets 
computers, the internet or the use of networks to infiltrate systems and processes. Criminals are 
no longer committing fraud the old-fashioned way; they have now opted for a more effortless 
way of committing fraud. Gragido and Pirc (2011:120) explain that cybercriminals sometimes 
use the same MO; this has been identified by means of malware, and command and control 
nodes on the internet. It has recently become evident that syndicates are using the same MO to 
target various short-term insurers by attempting to defraud them of large amounts of money. 
James and Nordby (2005:608) draw attention to the disadvantage of using MO during 
investigation, in that the MO is relied upon and, if there are even slight changes from crime to 
crime, investigators start looking for different criminals instead of concentrating on the 
similarities. 
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The researcher agrees with the authors, but from her experience as an investigator, suggests that 
the proper application of MO information can only benefit the investigation process. 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Santam Ltd is the leading general insurer in South Africa with a market share exceeding 
22% annualised gross written premium, growth of 9.5% and market capitalisation at 
almost R20 billion. The business is supported by a world-class contact centre 
infrastructure, a thriving intermediary network and more than 700 000 policyholders. The 
group has a subsidiary that operates in Namibia and, through Santam Re, sources business 
in other countries in Africa as well as in China, India, Indonesia and Malaysia (Santam, 
2012). 
Santam Ltd also partners with underwriting managers to deliver specialist and niche insurance 
solutions in a number of underwriting areas, including: marine, sectional title and share block 
property, industrial and commercial property, risk solutions for professionals, executives and 
business owners, hospitality and leisure, engineering, aviation, bonds and security, heavy 
commercial vehicles, crime and civil liability, travel insurance solutions, transport solutions 
such as minibus, midibus and metred taxis, and legal expense insurance (Santam, 2013). 
South Africa’s customer satisfaction index survey rated Santam Ltd as the top insurer for 2013 
(Santam, 2013). Santam Ltd won Reader’s Digest South Africa’s Most Trusted Brand survey 
for 2013. Santam Ltd was also voted the top corporate and commercial short-term insurer for 
2012 and 2014 by the Financial Intermediaries Association of Southern Africa. Within its 
Business Integrity Unit, Santam Ltd has a division identified as Forensic Services, which is 
mandated by the board of directors to investigate all allegations of fraud. The forensic 
department of Santam Ltd was established in 1992. Santam Ltd is committed to protecting the 
interests of honest policyholders and other stakeholders by eliminating fraud and minimising 
the impact thereof in every aspect of the company’s business activities. The goal of fraud 
prevention within the Santam Ltd Group is to manage the susceptibility to fraud risk with a view 
to reducing it, and raising the level of fraud awareness amongst employees and other relevant 
stakeholders. As a process, fraud prevention is not only intended to reduce the risk of fraud but 
also, upon the occurrence of fraud, to ensure detection and the provision of contingency plans 
that are focused on protecting the interests of Santam Ltd, where possible. It is furthermore 
aimed at ensuring the successful prosecution of any offender. The forensic investigators at 
3 
 
Santam Ltd are recruited specifically for their knowledge and skills related to the short-term 
insurance industry, forensic investigation, criminal and civil law, disciplinary procedures, and 
information technology. 
Santam has two wholly owned subsidiaries that operate under their own licences and with 
independent brands, namely, MiWay and Centriq. MiWay has its own Forensic Department that 
investigates insurance fraud and formed part of this study. MiWay is a direct short-term 
insurance company which offers a range of short-term insurance products, for example, vehicle, 
home, building, contents, motorcycle, bicycle and watercraft insurance. MiWay received the 
award for best medium-sized company in the Deloitte’s best company to work for survey in 
2012 (Santam, 2013). 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A research problem refers to a difficulty that exists in an area of concern, either in theory or in 
practice, to which the researcher endeavours to find a solution (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 
2005:14). Kumar (2005:40) emphasises the importance of formulating a research problem that 
clearly identifies “what you intend to research.” 
From the researcher’s viewpoint, short-term insurers and life insurers have established that there 
has been an increase in fraudulent claims over the past few years. Insurance fraud has been 
identified as a huge problem experienced within the short-term insurance industry. The 
continuous escalation of fraud within the short-term insurance industry has sparked great 
concern and created a need for all sorts of intervention to try to curb the increase of fraud and 
stop insurers from paying fraudulent claims to dishonest individuals. According to Association 
for Savings and Investments South Africa, approximately 70% of individuals who commit 
insurance fraud do so because of desperate circumstances and financial pressure due to loss of 
income attributed to job losses (Buthelezi, 2013).  
According to Uys (2014) insurance fraud is difficult to measure because it often goes undetected 
and there is unfortunately no accurate way of determining the exact extent of insurance fraud in 
South Africa as there is no central point for gathering this type of data in the country. However, 
the South African Insurance Crime Bureau (SAICB), now known as the Insurance Crime Bureau 
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(ICB) which represents majority of South Africa’s insurance providers, estimated that 30% of 
insurance claims submitted in 2013 contained fraudulent elements.  
Research based on a global fraud study in 2014 revealed that a typical organisation loses up to 
5% of its revenue each year to fraud; this translates to a potential projected global fraud loss of 
approximately 3.7 trillion dollars (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2014). Santam Ltd 
has confirmed a loss of R7.3 million to commercial crime in 2013; the 79 cases reported to the 
South African Police Services (SAPS) included theft, fraud and forgery. It has further been 
estimated that the South African short-term insurance industry loses R4 billion a year to fraud 
(Du Toit, 2013). According to the Santam Ltd Annual Forensics Statistics report for the period 
January 2013 to December 2013 (Santam, 2014), the department experienced an increase of 
approximately 15.84% in reported insurance fraud cases during 2012/2013. The forensic 
department investigated a total number of 1 813 cases for the abovementioned period. For the 
period January 2017 to December 2017, the forensic department reported 57 criminal cases 
totalling R12.8 million to the SAPS (Santam, 2017). From the researcher’s experience, 
examples of cases investigated are inflated claims and false claims submitted by claimants, 
service providers and brokers, as well as fraud committed by staff members and syndicate-
related fraud. 
MiWay’s forensic department experienced an increase of approximately 53% in reported 
insurance fraud cases during 2012/2013 and investigated a total number of 746 cases for the 
abovementioned period. Claims totalling R58.8 million were repudiated due to fraud and 
dishonesty (Santam, 2014). For the period January 2017 to December 2017, the MiWay forensic 
department reported 53 criminal cases totalling R14 million to the SAPS (Santam, 2017). 
From the researcher’s perspective, people are faced with surviving in an economy that has 
become distressingly expensive. This has created tremendous financial pressure for the 
community and contributed to an astonishing increase in insurance fraud in the short-term 
insurance industry. Individuals responsible for defrauding short-term insurers in South Africa 
have identified loopholes in the system and ways in which to easily perpetrate fraud, benefiting 
financially without being detected. The ability to do so has made the potential fraudster 
complacent in allowing the easy repetition of the crime. 
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The problem experienced is that most forensic investigators in the short-term insurance industry 
do not fully analyse the details pertaining to their investigation against their previous 
investigated cases and statistics within their department or the short-term insurance industry as 
a whole. Although there are currently advanced technological aids available to forensic 
investigators, this is not enough to reveal the MO used by criminals. There are disjointed efforts 
by insurers that form part of the short-term insurance industry in terms of collecting MO 
information and sharing this knowledge and intelligence. 
From the researcher’s experience and daily interaction with investigators in the short-term 
insurance industry, it became evident that forensic investigators fail to maximise the use of MO 
information during short-term insurance fraud investigations. They do not fully understand the 
advantages of using MO information during the investigation process. Some forensic 
investigators lack the knowledge and skills required for the use of MO information during the 
investigation of insurance fraud. 
According to the researcher, there are cases that have been successfully investigated by forensic 
investigators within the short-term insurance industry because the MO of perpetrators was 
identified and used to link cases, saving the industry from losing millions to fraud. It was 
therefore of extreme importance that this research be conducted and forensic investigators be 
made aware of the benefits that MO information can add by creating leads and linking cases 
through the use of MO information. This will contribute to the successful investigation of fraud 
cases, a higher conviction rate of criminals and a reduction in short-term insurance fraud. 
1.3.1 Researcher’s experience in using modus operandi information during forensic 
investigations 
The researcher is a former police official with six years’ investigation experience in the SAPS 
detective unit. In addition, the researcher has been conducting investigations for the past 10 
years at Santam Ltd where she is employed as a senior forensic investigator. The combination 
of investigative skills obtained from the SAPS and short-term insurance fraud investigations at 
Santam Ltd has equipped the researcher with the ability to use MO information during her 
investigations. From the researcher’s investigative experience the use of MO information is vital 
in the investigation of short term insurance fraud. Examples of these cases include linking a staff 
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member to 89 counts of third-party fraud to the value of R4.3 million, linkage of a syndicate to 
potential fraud amounting to R16 million within Santam Ltd and actual fraud of R38 million 
with an entity related to the banking industry, fraudulent travel claims orchestrated by a staff 
member totalling R8.5 million and the identification of a syndicate submitting staged vehicle 
accident claims operating within the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) region. 
1.4 AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
A research aim is a statement that clearly and broadly points out what the researcher hopes to 
accomplish, as well as the desired outcomes from the research (Maxwell, 2013:23). According 
to Mouton (1996:103), the aims of research are to establish facts, gather new data and determine 
whether there are interesting patterns contained in the data. 
The aim of the research was to explore the value of the application of MO information as a 
method during the investigation of short-term insurance fraud conducted by the forensic 
departments of short-term insurers in South Africa (Santam Ltd and MiWay). 
1.5 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of research indicates the direction and focuses of the research and provides the 
criteria against which the outcomes of the research can be evaluated (Denscombe, 2002:25). 
According to Babbie (2010:92), amongst the many purposes that social research can serve, the 
three most common purposes are exploration, description and explanation. 
The purpose of this study was as follows: 
 To explore, describe and explain the value of using MO information as a forensic 
investigation method during the investigation of short-term insurance fraud at the 
forensic departments of various short-term insurers. 
 To discover new information and patterns that can be used to maximise the use of MO 
in order to increase the detection of insurance fraud within the short-term insurance 
industry. 
 To determine recommendations for best practices based on the results of the data 
collected from the interviews, address any problems identified and improve the 
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investigative skills of the forensic investigators tasked with investigating short-term 
insurance fraud. 
 To apply new information acquired from the research conducted to further enhance 
performance and develop good practice in order to empower forensic investigators 
within the short-term insurance industry with new skills and knowledge pertaining to the 
application of MO information in the investigation of insurance fraud. 
1.6 DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY 
This study was limited to the forensic departments at Santam Ltd and MiWay in Gauteng. The 
forensic investigators at these insurers are mandated to investigate short-term insurance fraud. 
As a result, this study focused on the application of MO information as a method when 
investigating short-term insurance fraud. The researcher was of the opinion that this timeframe 
was sufficient for research purposes to establish the extent to which MO information was 
successfully utilised during the investigation of short-term insurance fraud. This study focused 
on two categories of short-term insurance fraud, namely, false claims and inflated claims. These 
false and inflated claims were based on incidents covered by short-term insurers, for example, 
motor vehicle accidents, theft, fire, hijacking and burglaries. 
 
1.7  RESEARCH QUESTION 
Research questions help narrow the purpose statement into predictions regarding what will be 
learned in the study or the questions to be answered (Creswell, 2014:139). Punch (2014:65) 
indicates that the role of research questions is to organise and delimit the project, providing 
direction and coherence. Punch states further that the research questions provide a framework 
while specifying the data that will be required. 
The researcher focused on the following research question to guide the research study:  
 What is the value of applying MO information as a forensic investigation method in the 
investigation of short-term insurance fraud? 
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1.8 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
Keywords are a list of approximately half a dozen of words describing the main areas of interest 
of one’s research (Silverman, 2013:336). Key concepts are defined to enable both the researcher 
and the reader to understand specifically what each concept means.  
The key concepts central to this study are as follows: 
1.8.1 Modus operandi 
Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:66) explain that modus operandi is derived from a Latin term 
which means “conduct”, “manner of conduct” or “operational method of procedure”. “Modus 
operandi” is defined as “a method of procedure; especially: a distinct pattern or method of 
operation that indicates or suggests the work of a single criminal in more than one crime” 
(Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2014).  
1.8.2  Insurance 
According to Kopel (2012:234), insurance is a contract: 
between an insurer and an insured, by which the insurer undertakes, in return for the 
payment of a price (premium), to give the insured a sum of money or its equivalent on the 
occurrence of a specified uncertain event in which the insured has some interest. 
1.8.3 Short-term insurance 
Anderson, Dodd and Roos (2006:198) define short-term insurance as: 
insurance for your car, home and furniture. Companies offer a variety of products and 
services to take care of their clients’ insurance needs. Products include personal and 
commercial short-term insurance products, and services delivered to the client through a 
broker network or, with some companies, through direct marketing. 
1.8.4 Fraud 
According to Joubert (2001:153), “[f]raud is the unlawful and intentional making of a 
misrepresentation with fraudulent intent so that the prejudiced person suffers actual or potential 
prejudice.” 
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1.8.5 Intelligence 
According to Cordner and Scarborough (2010:91), intelligence involves collecting and 
analysing information that relates to the existence, scope and impact of gangs, organised crime, 
drug trafficking and terrorism. For the purpose of this study intelligence refers to the collecting 
and analysing of MO information in the investigation of short term insurance fraud. 
1.8.6 False claim 
According to Kopel (2012:241), a false or fabricated claim is when the insured suffers no actual 
loss, or no loss covered on the insurance policy. The insured lies or may even cause the loss and 
later fraudulently represents to the insurer that the loss was caused by an event specified on the 
policy. 
1.8.7 Inflated claim 
According to Kopel (2012:241), an inflated or exaggerated claim is when the insured suffers an 
actual loss but claims for a larger amount. This involves an exaggeration of the loss, which 
enables the insured to claim for more than the actual loss. 
1.9 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
According to Denscombe (2002:43), the research must be relevant in terms of contributing to 
existing knowledge, solving practical needs and being of relevance to current issues. This 
research contributes to the body of knowledge regarding the value of the use of MO information 
in the investigation of short-term insurance fraud.  
Santam Ltd is currently South Africa’s leading short-term insurer. Santam Ltd and MiWay 
receive a huge number of fraudulent insurance claims that are undetected and therefore settled 
to those claimants who have found ways to penetrate the system and defraud the company. After 
the completion of this research, this study and the results gained will be of advantage to the 
forensic investigators of Santam Ltd and MiWay, as well as other short-term insurers, as it will 
improve their knowledge and competence regarding the application of MO information during 
the detection and investigation of fraudulent claims.  
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The outcome of this research will be useful for investigators because it can enhance the 
investigation of fraud cases. All forensic investigators would benefit from this research because 
it will empower them with knowledge on the use of MO information during their investigation 
process. They will also be able to benchmark their current practices against the findings of this 
research.  
The findings can also be used as a tool to rectify shortcomings and enhance training 
interventions for forensic investigators. The acquired knowledge will also be available to the 
University of South Africa (Unisa) and the greater academic community. It can be used both in 
curriculum development and as a source for students and researchers. South African society will 
benefit if fraud cases can be solved efficiently and timeously, thereby creating a higher 
conviction rate. Short-term insurers increase insurance premiums as a result of insurance fraud. 
Reduction of insurance fraud will benefit South African policyholders as they will not be 
subjected to increasing insurance premiums as a direct result of insurance fraud. 
 
1.10 RESEARCH DESIGN 
“Research design is the process of focusing your perspective for the purposes of a particular 
study” (Babbie, 2011:93). According to Babbie and Mouton (2011:76), empirical research is the 
production of knowledge based on interviews and observation. Similarly, Punch (2014:2) 
defines ‘empirical’ as something that is based on direct experience or observation. 
In this study, empirical research allowed the researcher to obtain first-hand information from 
the participants via semi-structured interviews regarding their actual experiences pertaining to 
the value of using MO information while investigating insurance fraud. The advantage of using 
empirical research was that it enabled the researcher to obtain comprehensive information from 
the participants. It also created flexibility for the researcher to probe responses while conducting 
the interviews. 
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1.11 RESEARCH APPROACH 
The researcher chose a qualitative research approach in support of the empirical research design 
that was used. This was done by using face-to-face interviews with a semi-structured interview 
schedule to obtain information from forensic investigators about their practical knowledge and 
personal experience (Creswell, 1994:21). 
Qualitative research is an approach used by researchers to explore and understand social life in 
its natural habitat through the method of observation (Babbie, 2010:295). According to Creswell 
(2014:19), when using the qualitative approach, the researcher seeks to identify the phenomenon 
from the view of participants. Kumar (2005:12) describes qualitative research as an unstructured 
approach, which is beneficial as it allows flexibility during the research process.  
The qualitative approach was best suited to carry out this research as it was the intention of the 
researcher to obtain practical answers and real-life examples from the forensic investigators 
tasked with investigating short-term insurance fraud. 
1.12 POPULATION AND SAMPLING 
According to Mouton (1996:134), a population is a collection of objects, events or individuals 
with some common characteristic that the researcher is interested in studying. 
It would have been ideal to conduct research including all the forensic investigators responsible 
for the investigation of short-term insurance fraud in the short-term insurance industry in South 
Africa, in order to determine the true extent of the research problem. Practically, it was not 
possible to interview all the forensic investigators due to time, financial and geographic 
constraints. The researcher decided to resort to a target population consisting of forensic 
investigators attached to Santam Ltd and MiWay, as per section 1.6, who are employed in 
Gauteng and Cape Town. 
The target population consisted of certified fraud examiners, forensic investigators who were 
previously employed by the SAPS and former members of the National Prosecuting Authority. 
Some participants also possessed legal and postgraduate forensic qualifications. These forensic 
investigators were: 
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 Well-trained and acquainted with knowledge regarding the short-term insurance 
industry.  
 In possession of an immense amount of investigation skill and years of experience. 
 Employed to investigate short-term insurance fraud – both opportunistic and organised. 
Their responsibilities include investigation of all allegations of economic crime 
perpetrated against the organisation or its clients. 
Marshall and Rossman (2011:105) emphasise the need for well-developed sampling decisions, 
which are to be made in advance, concurrently with the specific data collection methods. The 
researcher made use of a non-probability sample selected through purposive sampling. Maxwell 
(1997:69-100) asserts that purposive samples are used when particular people, events or settings 
are chosen because they are known to provide important information that could not be gained 
from other sampling designs. In this kind of approach, the researcher exercises a degree of 
judgement about who will provide the best perspectives on the phenomenon of interest. 
Purposive sampling was thus applied to select a sample of 18 forensic investigators (including 
managers and data analysts) from Santam Ltd and MiWay who investigate incidents of 
insurance fraud within their respective short-term insurance companies. The sample of the 
forensic department at Santam Ltd comprised 11 most knowledgeable forensic investigators. 
MiWay’s forensic department comprised 60 forensic investigators; however, only seven of the 
most knowledgeable forensic team leaders were included in the sample. These 18 forensic 
investigators were considered to provide the best perspectives on the use of MO information in 
the investigation of short-term insurance fraud due to their knowledge and experience gained 
over a lengthy period. Data were gathered until saturation was reached.  
1.13 DATA COLLECTION 
The data collection process entails creating a framework for the study and collecting data 
through unstructured or semi-structured observations and interviews as well as documents 
(Creswell, 2014:189). Marshall and Rossman (2011:137) suggest that qualitative researchers 
rely on interviewing in depth and analysing documents as primary methods for gathering 
information. Since a qualitative research method was used in this study, the researcher used 
interviews and a literature review as data collection techniques.  
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1.13.1 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with participants. “In a semi-structured interview, 
the research may follow the standard questions with one or more individually tailored questions 
to get clarification or probe a person’s reasoning” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013:190). Babbie 
(2010:318) states that the qualitative interview is based on an in-depth set of topics in contrast 
to a survey interview, which makes use of standardised questions. 
The researcher chose to conduct semi-structured interviews with forensic investigators 
employed at Santam Ltd and MiWay. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
investigators from both insurers. An interview guide was formulated using the problem 
statement, research aim and research question. This was advantageous as it created the flexibility 
required to probe answers from the participants. Real-life experiences, knowledge and examples 
pertaining to this study were retrieved. Face-to-face interviews were conducted personally by 
the researcher to maintain consistency. With permission from the participants, a digital 
recording device was used during the interviews; all interviews were later transcribed to ensure 
an accurate and complete reflection of participants’ responses. 
1.13.2 Literature review 
According to De Vos, Strydom, Fouché, Poggenpoel and Schurink (1998:90), the analysis and 
interpretation of written material provide distinct challenges but enable the qualitative 
researcher to collect information which could not otherwise have become available. Marshall 
and Rossman (2011:78) add that a literature review is the basis of a logical framework; it 
demonstrates gaps identified in previous research and helps refine the research questions. The 
researcher was guided by the aims of the research, as well as the research questions, when 
reviewing the literature. 
Literature on the use and value of MO information was sourced from the various Unisa 
Goldfields libraries. A variety of sources, namely manuals, journals, records, documents and 
magazines, was also utilised in this research. Information published on the internet was accessed 
and used to determine the latest local and international trends regarding MO.  
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1.14 DATA ANALYSIS 
According to Babbie (2010:117), data analysis takes place once all the data have been collected. 
The data are interpreted to find conclusions that are indicative of ideas and theories of the initial 
enquiry. 
The researcher used the data analysis spiral as proposed by Leedy and Ormrod (2010:53) to 
analyse the data collected and followed the steps listed below: 
 Interviews and a literature review were the sources of the raw data. 
 The raw data were organised by breaking down the units of data into smaller parts. The 
researcher arranged the data into categories for analysis. 
 In perusing the data several times, a better understanding of their contents was obtained 
to secure a holistic interpretation of the data that were retrieved during interviews, 
literate reviews and case analysis. 
 The researcher then broke down the data into units for classification and analysis, with 
an attempt to identify the themes and relationships in the data. 
 The final step included the synthesis of the data by creating hypotheses and propositions, 
and compiling tables and graphs to make the research easily understandable for readers. 
 
1.15 METHODS TO ENSURE TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Leedy and Ormrod (2013:262) explain that trustworthiness relates to the “extent to which others 
perceive the study’s findings to be convincing and worth taking seriously.” In the past, 
trustworthiness of qualitative research was extracted from natural and experimental sciences, 
and reliability, validity, objectivity and generalisability were the measurement criteria used to 
judge the soundness of a qualitative study (Marshall & Rossman, 2011:39). 
1.15.1  Validation strategies (credibility) 
Validity of research relates to the interpretation of observations, irrespective of whether the 
conclusion reached by the researcher is supported by the data and practical in terms of 
previously conducted research (Silverman, 2013:285). Validity, according to Denscombe 
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(2002:100), concerns the accuracy of the questions asked, the data collected and the explanation 
offered, and generally relates to the data and the analysis used in the research. 
An interview guide was compiled based on the problem statement, research aim and research 
questions. The participants were requested to voluntarily complete an informed consent form. 
A standard interview guide containing the same questions was used for all participants to ensure 
accuracy, and quality was maintained throughout the research process. 
In terms of validity of the data collection instruments, the interviews were conducted in private 
and were recorded and transcribed to ensure a true reflection of what the participants had to 
contribute to the research. A comprehensive review of the literature on the topic was conducted. 
The data gathered for the purposes of this study were treated in confidence and no data was 
changed or manipulated in any way. 
1.15.2 Methods to ensure reliability (dependability) 
Reliability refers to methods of data collection and the importance of data analysis being 
consistent and not distorting the findings. To ensure reliability, the interviews and the evaluation 
of the data collected were conducted by the researcher personally to ensure that the analysis was 
carried out consistently. “Reliability refers to the ability of the research process to provide 
results that do not vary from occasion to occasion and that do not vary according to the particular 
persons undertaking the research” (Denscombe, 2002:100). 
The researcher made sure that the participants selected for this study were skilled and 
experienced in the investigation of fraud within the short-term insurance industry. All the data 
obtained, for example, recorded interviews, transcripts and case studies were kept available for 
control purposes. The researcher confirms that reliable measures were utilised throughout the 
research and that no data was manipulated. 
1.16 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Kumar (2005:210) explains that the purpose of a code of ethics is to provide a guide to 
accommodate changing ethos, values, needs and expectations of the stakeholders. The 
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researcher abided to University of South Africa’s (2007:7) code of conduct for researchers as 
stated in the Policy on Research Ethics of the University of South Africa. 
The ethical guidelines that were adhered to during this study, namely, informed consent and 
preserving anonymity and confidentiality, are discussed below. 
1.16.1 Informed consent 
The researcher obtained permission from the heads of the Santam Ltd forensic department and 
MiWay to conduct the research and obtained the written consent of every interview participant. 
The researcher endeavoured to enter into an agreement with every person being interviewed that 
they were interviewed at free will and had the option to withdraw should they feel uncomfortable 
at any stage of the interviewing process. The researcher also notified potential participants from 
the start what the study involved and allowed them the chance to withdraw. Participation in this 
study did not entitle participants to any form of compensation, reimbursement, gifts or services. 
1.16.2 Preserving anonymity and confidentiality 
The researcher strived to maintain each participant’s privacy. The interviews were conducted in 
a safe and private location where the participants could feel at ease. The interviews were 
conducted at the convenience of the participants and at venues chosen by the researcher. The 
information obtained from each participant was kept confidential, was not shared with other 
participants and was only used for the purpose of this study. 
1.17 SUMMARY  
In this chapter, the research was introduced by providing a short background, followed by an 
overview of the conceptual framework for the study. The research problem, that is, the failure 
of Santam and MiWay forensic departments to optimally use MO information during the 
investigation of short-term insurance fraud, was explored. This was followed by an explanation 
of the research aim, research objectives and research questions relevant to the study. This 
chapter further provided a summary on how data were collected and analysed, and included the 
limitations applicable to the study as well as the research problem identified in the study. The 
relevant key terms were clarified, and the method chosen to ensure the reliability and validity 
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of the study was described. This chapter concluded with the ethical framework followed in the 
study. 
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CHAPTER 2 AN OVERVIEW OF MODUS OPERANDI AS INVESTIGATIVE 
TECHNIQUE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SHORT-
TERM INSURANCE FRAUD 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The researcher is of the opinion that the statistics pertaining to the increase of fraud within the 
short-term insurance industry show a need for commercial crime investigations to be dealt with 
more innovatively and efficiently. One such innovative investigative technique that could be 
utilised with success is the application of MO information in the investigation of short-term 
insurance fraud. Investigators need to explore the use of creative and resourceful ideas to 
adequately investigate crimes such as short-term insurance fraud. Short-term insurance fraud 
committed in modern times is complex to investigate since fraudsters use inventive methods to 
commit fraud. Investigators benefit from having the latest technological systems at their disposal 
to assist with investigations. However, these technological aids are sometimes inadequate to 
assist in successfully solving insurance fraud since fraudsters also have access to advanced 
technology and methodologies, which enables them to plan and commit crimes with ease. 
The significance of MO in the investigation of short-term insurance fraud is underestimated. 
Forensic investigators lack the knowledge and fail to invest time in utilising information about 
the MO used by short-term insurance fraudsters as identification technique. This lack of 
understanding and awareness of the significance of MO information amongst investigators has 
contributed to the increase in insurance fraud, both locally and internationally. Short-term 
insurance fraudsters often make use of a specific MO when committing fraud. Once a fraudster 
is successful with the first attempt, for example, in submitting a false or inflated claim, they 
would often repeat the same method with confidence as a result of not being detected. 
This chapter focuses on the application and value of MO information in forensic investigation, 
case linkage using MO and record-keeping of MO information. This chapter also provides an 
overview of short-term insurance fraud and its various subcategories. In addition, this chapter 
incorporates and presents the outcomes of the interviews conducted with forensic investigators 
employed at Santam and MiWay’s forensic departments. The results of the interviews depict 
the experiences, feelings and perceptions of forensic investigators in respect of the application 
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of MO information during the investigation of short-term insurance fraud. The questions and 
answers of the participants are illustrated followed by interpretation of the responses. 
A discussion of the applications of MO information in forensic investigation follows. 
2.2 THE APPLICATION OF MODUS OPERANDI INFORMATION IN FORENSIC 
INVESTIGATION 
The factors that can determine or influence MO follow for discussion. 
2.2.1 Factors that can determine or influence modus operandi 
Bartol and Bartol (2013:35) explain that MO refers to actions followed by an offender to 
successfully commit a crime. The behavioural pattern is learned as experience is gained in 
committing the offence. Bartol and Bartol further caution that the MO of repeat offenders may 
change over time while attempting to develop the most effective method. According to 
Sennewald and Tsukayama (2001:222), when a crime or misconduct is repeated, by inference, 
how it occurred becomes predictable and the MO of the perpetrator is consistent. This indicates 
a solution strategy; for example, if an employee steals funds by fraudulently organising refund 
documents, that employee will continue to pursue the same specific method of committing theft, 
as he or she perceives it to be the winning way. 
Canter (2004:240) found that behavioural linkage analysis is based on two beliefs: firstly, 
behavioural stability in that offenders are normally consistent and therefore a series of crimes 
include common characteristics; and secondly, behavioural distinctiveness, which relates to the 
view that each offender’s crime series represents specific features that successfully serve as his 
or her behavioural signature. In support of Sennewald and Tsukayama (2001:222), Turvey 
(2012:336) explains that offenders distinguish and utilise more proficient and effective ways 
when committing crimes. Repetition of these traits in future offences increases their skill, which 
strengthens and fortifies their MO.  
According to Turvey (2012:336), MO behaviour is influenced by factors such as: 
 educational and technical materials;  
 trade or professional experience; 
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 criminal experience and confidence; 
 contact with the criminal justice system; and  
 the media. 
MO behaviour can also change due to the perpetrator’s deteriorating mental state, the influence 
of controlled substances or an increased confidence that he or she will not successfully be 
apprehended. These factors may influence the perpetrator in becoming less skilful, less 
competent and more careless (Turvey, 2002:32). The researcher supports the above sentiments 
of Sennewald and Tsukayama (2001:222) as well as Turvey, as it has become evident from 
previous investigations that fraudsters have a tendency to lack attention to detail when 
fabricating documents or providing information when submitting a fraudulent claim. The 
researcher is of the view that this happens when fraudsters become more complacent and 
confident. 
Bennett and Hess (2004:5) highlight the fact that some criminals are responsible for committing 
different crimes, influenced by opportunity, need, sophistication or the inability to repeat certain 
crimes. Bennet and Hess suggest that care must be taken not to eliminate suspects if the MO 
does not match the crime under investigation. Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:66) support this, 
listing the following as additional factors which determine the MO of criminals: 
 opportunity to commit a crime;  
 physical qualities; 
 changing needs and desires; 
 the situation in which they find themselves; and  
 knowledge and experience. 
According to Van der Westhuizen (1996:33), past research has indicated that criminals tend to 
follow a constant, “stereotyped pattern of conduct” and often use individualised techniques 
during the commission of a crime.  
Tupman (1998:3) illustrates that it is not certain that, if one suspect utilises a specific MO, he 
or she is the only suspect using that MO. Likewise, when groups of criminals are known to 
commit a particular crime in a particular fashion, it is not safe to assume that new criminals are 
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not following the same trend. For this reason, Tupman points out that stereotyping can be 
dangerous and explains that changes in MO need to be examined in white collar crimes, such as 
fraud, because fraudsters have a tendency to change their pattern of behaviour in response to 
new opportunities. 
Santos (2013:172) concurs with Tupman (1998:3) and is of the opinion that relationships 
amongst incidents and identified patterns are educated guesses made by crime analysts. Santos 
therefore asserts that, unless a perpetrator is arrested and confesses, there is no surety that a 
specific suspect is responsible for committing crimes that are linked by the same MO.  
Participants in this study were asked to answer questions regarding the utilisation and 
management of MO information as well as the value associated with MO information during 
the investigation of short-term insurance fraud. Participants were asked the following question: 
From your experience, what factors can determine or influence a short-term insurance 
fraudster’s modus operandi? The purpose of the question was to investigate participants’ 
interpretations of the value of MO information in the identification of short-term insurance 
fraudsters.  
It appears from the responses that the participants were knowledgeable regarding factors that 
may influence a short-term insurance fraudster’s MO. Various reasons were provided, and the 
participants’ responses to the question are summarised as follows: 
 Ten participants shared the opinion that weak processes and controls within the 
environment created loopholes that influenced a short-term insurance fraudster’s MO. 
 In addition, eight participants were also of the view that a short-term insurance 
fraudster’s MO was influenced by opportunity, financial pressure and greed. 
 Four participants highlighted the fact that fraudsters and criminal groups kept abreast of 
the latest trends and technology, providing fake identities and false information to avoid 
being detected. 
 One participant believed that the time of month and type of claim submitted also 
influenced the MO of a fraudster. 
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 One participant had a different opinion to the other participants and stated that flags 
placed on the system of clients that either committed fraud or had dishonest claims also 
influenced the MO of fraudsters, in that they resulted in elimination. 
In relation to the above literature on factors that can determine or influence MO, the feedback 
received from the participants clearly indicates that participants were knowledgeable about the 
aspects that could affect a short-term insurance fraudster’s MO. Weak controls and processes 
within the environment seem to be the major contributing factor that enables fraudsters to 
successfully commit fraud with ease. 
The value of MO information in forensic investigation follows for discussion. 
2.3 THE VALUE OF MODUS OPERANDI INFORMATION IN FORENSIC 
INVESTIGATION 
The identification and application of MO information during fraud investigation is extremely 
beneficial because there is a documentary trail that can link crimes through bank accounts, 
identity numbers, handwriting, email, cell phone numbers or addresses, unlike with serious and 
violent crimes. Sennewald and Tsukayama (2001:31) state that the most important aspect of 
intelligence to the investigator is mental recall or memory. This is the skill to remember small 
details that may seem unrelated but may later help in making logical connections which result 
in solving the case at hand. Examples of these details include names, events, faces, vehicles, a 
phrase or even a criminal’s MO. 
Hollin (2013:275) emphasises that the use of MO information has several benefits, such as 
successful crime linkage. In addition, the accurate collation of information adds weight to 
evidence against the offender and increases the chances of conviction. MO information 
additionally allows for a set of crimes to be investigated as a group instead of individually, with 
the result that resources can be used more efficiently. 
Van der Watt, Van Graan and Labuschagne (2014:64) explain that, in addition to linking cases, 
MO also gives understanding relating to the intentions and individualities of the offender. 
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Being alert about the perpetrator’s MO can assist investigations in the following manner 
(College of Policing, 2017): 
 Recognising how a specific crime has been committed, the type of material that could 
have been generated in the commission of the offence and the whereabouts of this 
material. 
 Detecting a linked series of crimes committed with the same MO. 
 Identifying links between crimes and known offenders who make use of the same MO. 
 Predicting imminent crime patterns, enhancing the possibility of apprehending 
offenders.  
Osterburg and Ward (2010:120) further suggest that MO information can assist in the 
identification and apprehension of a suspect and can additionally be utilised in planning 
approaches for preventing crime. Gathered MO information can result in an investigator 
searching records, setting up surveillance or procuring an informant. Marais and Van Rooyen 
(1990:66) underpin MO as an identification technique that affords individualising value during 
investigations. This can reduce the number of suspects involved, thus providing direction with 
regard to the entire investigation process. Marais and Van Rooyen further advocate that the MO 
of criminals is worthless in the absence of proper exploitation of the information and the failure 
to study, classify and record this information for future comparison and identification. Van der 
Westhuizen (1996:64) reinforces that the results retrieved with the aid of MO information are 
reliant on the administration and control of the MO system. The usage of the system in a 
meaningful, scientific way is dependent on the knowledge, skill, dedication and precision of the 
investigator. 
In this regard, participants were first asked the following question: Do you use modus operandi 
information during the investigation of short-term insurance fraud? The purpose of the question 
was to determine whether participants used MO information during their investigation of short-
term insurance fraud.  
All the participants acknowledged using MO information during the investigation of short-term 
insurance fraud. The participants’ motivations for their answers included the following: 
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 Experience in identifying MO is a very useful tool during investigations. 
 Using MO information makes investigation easy and reduces turnaround times in 
resolving investigations. 
 Searches are conducted with trigger words on the database to monitor commonalities in 
claims example, bank account numbers, and cell phone numbers, email addresses, 
location etc. 
 If used effectively, MO information can aid in linking suspects to several policies and 
claims. 
 Using MO information assists in detecting more fraudulent activity than initially 
reported. 
 Intelligence is used to identify crime patterns to determine MO of offenders. 
 Information on MO circulated via the Insurance Crime Bureau (ICB) allows for 
successful identification of syndicates targeting various insurers, which also prevents 
insurers from paying false claims. 
Secondly, participants were asked the following question: In your opinion, is there any value in 
applying modus operandi information as a forensic investigation method in the investigation of 
short-term insurance fraud? The purpose of the question was to explore whether participants 
understood the value of applying MO information during the investigation of short-term 
insurance fraud. 
 All the participants agreed that there was definite value in applying MO information as 
a forensic investigation method in the investigation of short-term insurance fraud. In 
addition to the above motivation provided, participants provided the following opinions: 
- MO information enables identification of all transactions, allowing more 
comprehensive investigations to be carried out. 
- MO information helps in developing effective controls to prevent fraud from 
occurring. 
- MO information helps in detecting control breakdowns in underwriting and the 
claims environment. 
- MO information allows more effective information seeking interviews to be 
conducted. 
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 Two participants were of the view that more concerted efforts should be made by 
insurers to provide comprehensive information in order to effectively identify MO 
patterns. 
 In contrast to the other participants, one participant was of the opinion that there needed 
to be a proper understanding of the subject; in other words, an investigator would need 
to understand how criminals operate in order to identify MO patterns. 
In relation to the above literature on the value of MO information in forensic investigation, it is 
evident from the participants’ responses that they not only used MO information during the 
investigation of short-term insurance fraud but also understood the importance and value 
thereof. 
A discussion on case linkage using MO is presented in the next section. 
2.4 CASE LINKAGE USING MODUS OPERANDI 
“A crime series is identified only when enough similarities exist to support the theory that the 
same person or persons perpetrated a set of crimes” (Osborne & Wernicke, 2003:21). According 
to Dempsey (2003:36), components that enable investigators to learn and understand facts 
regarding an occurrence during the investigation process include patterns, leads and tips. 
Dempsey describes a pattern as a series of similarities that can be used to link specific cases or 
point out that the same individual committed a series of crimes. These patterns can include 
details such as time, MO, victim, location and description of offender.   
MO plays an important role when attempting to link cases (Yokota & Watanabe, 2002:5). This 
view is supported by James and Nordby (2003:539), who proclaim that the traditional technique 
to link cases is by identifying a criminals MO. 
The researcher states that investigators can effectively investigate and link fraudulent claims 
using a number of the following techniques: 
 Following the discernible pattern utilised by the fraudster to falsify documents submitted 
for the claim. 
 Discovering similarities in descriptions of events provided. 
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 Repeated use of the same cell phone number, street address, postal address, bank account 
or email address. 
 Location of crime or where the fraud is committed. 
 Handwriting. 
 Voice identification. 
 MO. 
Case linkage is becoming a necessity during the investigation of short-term insurance fraud, as 
a trend has been identified with individuals and syndicates in that they are applying the same 
MO, using the same details, for example, invoices, registration numbers, identity numbers and 
descriptions of losses, when submitting false claims to various insurers.  
According to Woodhams, Bull and Hollin (2007:117), evidence relating to a perpetrator who is 
responsible for committing a series of crimes is not only useful for the purposes of investigation, 
but similar fact evidence has also proven to be beneficial when presented in legal proceedings. 
In support of this view, James and Nordby (2003:523) declare that, from an investigative 
perspective, the linking of crimes enables investigators to track one suspect instead of 
functioning without the knowledge that particular cases are linked. Police investigators and 
prosecutors also have a need to have similar cases linked; the purpose is for the offender to be 
tried on multiple charges in the same trial. 
In this regard, participants were asked the following question: Do you use MO to identify 
similarities that can be used to link specific cases or point out that the same individual 
committed a series of crimes? The purpose of this question was to determine whether 
participants used MO information to identify patterns and link multiple cases to a specific 
individual. A summary of the participants’ responses follows: 
 All the participants expressed that they used MO to identify patterns and link various 
cases to the same individual or syndicates. This was made possible in any of the 
following ways: 
- Experience and mental recall. 
- The use of MO red flags to link cases or persons. 
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- The use of data analytical tools to run checks on personal details, such as ID 
numbers. 
 In contrast to the abovementioned participants, one participant acknowledged that he did 
not use MO information to link cases often, because various people worked with 
different clients and claims and the possibility of identifying MO was therefore limited 
as information was only shared during meetings. 
 One participant pointed out that data analysis could be restrictive as it was limited to the 
company database. Although the ICB assists with sharing information across the short-
term insurance industry, this is still not comprehensive as not all short-term insurers are 
members of the ICB. 
In relation to the above literature on case linkage using operandi information, it appears from 
the participants’ responses that, although MO information is used to identify similarities and 
link cases, the short-term insurance industry is still not utilising MO information effectively. 
The management of MO information is discussed in the subsequent section. 
2.5 RECORD-KEEPING AND MANAGEMENT OF MODUS OPERANDI 
INFORMATION 
Yotoka and Watanabe (2002:5) states that MO files allow investigators to identify a form of 
criminal behaviour and to link a group of crimes to a single offender by means of recorded 
information. Osterburg (1968:154) emphasises that record-keeping adds value to the 
investigation process, explaining that records should be regarded as stored information, which 
should be retrieved by an imaginative investigator should the need arise. These records can be 
extremely beneficial in providing new leads, identifying offenders, tracing suspects and 
recovering stolen property. Storage of MO information can be maintained in various ways, 
ranging from electronic mapping technologies to in-house data banks (Adderley & Musgrove, 
2003:265). In addition to the various data systems managed within the forensic departments, an 
advanced data analytics software company called SAS is becoming extremely popular and is 
currently being used by the ICB and Santam (Ltd). Santam (Ltd) recognises the value 
technology plays in detecting and preventing insurance crime, Santam has therefore 
implemented a strategy to employ technology in the fight against insurance fraud. The SAS 
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Fraud Framework uses technology and several data sets to identify high risk transactions and 
relationships (Figure 2.1). These high risk transactions and relationships are thereafter analysed 
to determine if there are any elements of fraud or if there is a need for further investigation.  
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Figure 2.1: SAS Visual Investigator Alert diagram illustrating links to vehicles, 
addresses, cell phones and bank accounts 
 
(Hartley, 2018:17)  
30 
 
The researcher explains in absence of advanced technology, claims under investigation are 
normally shared amongst several forensic investigators working within a department. These 
claims get investigated and the MO information pertaining to the fraudulent claim is generally 
captured on the company’s database in isolation under a specific reference number. If various 
fraudulent claims are submitted by a serial fraudster or syndicate, identifying links with MO 
becomes virtually impossible. It is therefore significant to compile a spread sheet or table to 
identify trends and commonalities of serial offenders. 
Table 2.1 below illustrates an example of a matrix that could also be used effectively to identify 
the MO of fraudsters. The rape matrix can be adapted and used to collect MO information during 
the investigation of short term insurance fraud. 
Table 2.1: Rape matrix results for the ‘Kwadwesi Bush Rapist’ 
 Kwadwesi  Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Active for investigation 175 days 229 days 177 days 
Scene Kwadwesi bushes opposite 
Kwadwesi extension 
Kwadwesi bushes at the back 
of the shopping complex 
Kwadwesi bushes 
Victim Black female, 15 years old Black female, 32 years old Black female, 16 years old 
Date 2007-01-19 2007-03-03 2008-01-16 
Day Friday Saturday Wednesday 
Time 08:00 07:30 14:45 
Suspect description Black male Black male Black male 
 
Clothing description 
Navy blue tracksuit top, black 
pants with yellow stripes, torn 
white dirty sports shoes, maroon 
and white balaclava, ‘Chinese- 
like’ eyes, scales on hands. 
Navy trousers, dotted black 
and white shirt, blue and white 
sports shoes. 
Not mentioned. 
 
Approach by suspect 
Blitz: The victim was on her way 
to school taking a short cut 
through the bushes. The 
suspect grabbed her from 
behind, around her waist and 
arms and also strangled her. 
Blitz: The victim was on her 
way to visit her boyfriend 
when the suspect strangled 
her from behind and ordered 
her not to scream. She was 
ordered to go deeper into the 
bushes. 
Blitz: The victim was on her 
way back from school when 
she was suddenly grabbed 
around her neck by the suspect 
and dragged into the bushes. 
 
Control over victim 
The suspect made verbal 
threats and was in possession 
of a knife. 
The suspect was in 
possession of a knife. 
The suspect was in possession 
of a knife. 
 
Victim raped 
The victim was raped three 
times vaginally. 
The victim was raped 
continuously until the suspect 
ejaculated. 
Raped once: “He wet his 
fingers and my vagina before 
everything started” 
 
Unique actions or 
verbal interaction 
The victim was told to put down 
her bag, pull down her 
pantyhose and take off her 
clothes. 
The suspect repeatedly told 
the victim to take off her 
clothes. 
The suspect told the victim to 
take off her panties. He also 
told her to “shut up” when she 
cried and not to scream. 
Condom used No Not mentioned No 
Stolen items None None None 
Harm to victim Strangled Strangled Grabbed from behind around 
her neck (strangled) 
(Van der Watt et al., 2014:68) 
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A matrix containing detailed information attempts to determine the identity of the 
perpetrator, MO used, pattern of behaviour, mapping of the crimes as well as timelines 
followed. 
Firstly, participants were asked the following question: Do you keep a record of modus operandi 
information pertaining to short-term insurance fraud? The objective of this question was to 
confirm whether MO information is effectively managed by participants. 
 Eight participants from MiWay confirmed that they keep records of MO information 
pertaining to short-term insurance fraud. The information is stored on their internal 
database and is also shared with the ICB. 
A summary of the Santam participants’ responses follows: 
 Six participants stated that records were kept of MO information, either captured on a 
case management system, on spreadsheets or in the form of working papers. 
 In contrast, five participants indicated that there were no formal records available 
containing accurate MO information. 
Secondly, participants were asked the following question: Do you make use of a database or an 
integrated approach, which interlinks with other short-term insurers to examine and verify your 
information, ensuring the correctness and value thereof? The purpose of this question was to 
ascertain the quality of MO information obtained by participants and to establish whether they 
share this information amongst other insurers.  
Thirteen participants confirmed using their internal database and making use of the ICB to 
channel enquiries, verify and share information with other short-term insurers in the industry. 
Additionally, varied views were obtained from individual participants as follows: 
 A joint approach maintained between MiWay and Santam was acknowledged in that 
fraud lists were compared to identify commonalities. 
 There is difficulty in linking systems with other insurers due to different operating 
technologies. 
 Short-term insurers are not cooperating as they are bound by confidentiality. 
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 There is a need for more concerted efforts between insurers to share information that 
will assist in identifying trends. 
 Interaction with the ICB takes time, as there is an absence of a direct automated process 
linking to other insurers. 
 The internal database does not capture MO-specific detail and therefore cannot provide 
effective link analysis. 
 Short-term insurers work in silos and do not provide detailed MO information. 
In contrast to the above literature on case linkage using modus operandi information, it appears 
from the participants’ responses that the lack of information-sharing and coordination between 
short-term insurers in South Africa is a motivating factor for limited knowledge pertaining to 
different MO trends used by fraudsters. 
An overview of short-term insurance fraud is presented next. 
2.6 AN OVERVIEW OF SHORT-TERM INSURANCE FRAUD 
The purpose of short-term insurance, a contextualisation of insurance fraud and types of short-
term insurance fraud follow for discussion. 
2.6.1 The purpose of short-term insurance 
The purpose of short-term insurance is to protect personal or business assets, such as one’s 
home, home contents and motor vehicles, against liability claims and accidents. Insurance is a 
type of safeguard given to victims of crime, accidents and certain other mishaps or acts of nature 
(Masters & Dupont, 2002:36). Upon the occurrence of such an event, the client is indemnified 
for the loss and placed in more or less the same position he or she was prior to the happening of 
the said event. Insurance therefore plays an important role in society (Hoppe, 2012:1).  
Insurance can be defined as a “risk distribution system that requires the accumulation of liquid 
assets in the form of reserve funds” – these funds are then made available to pay out claims in 
terms of losses suffered by policyholders (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012). 
Viaene and Dedene (2004:314) define insurance as a contractual relationship in which an insurer 
agrees with a policyholder on the payment of a premium to make financial provision on behalf 
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of the insured party to provide cover after a formal claim has been submitted for the loss of an 
insurable interest resulting from one or more future indefinite events. 
Grant (2012:5) further explains that insurance involves individuals or entities referred to as 
policyholders paying a premium at regular intervals into an insurance fund from which money 
is taken to pay a claim to compensate policyholders who have suffered a loss that is covered by 
the insurance contract. 
Skipper (1997:13) summarises the way in which insurance contributes to society and economic 
growth as follows: 
 It allows for the efficient management of different risks. 
 It reduces or mitigates loss. 
 It promotes financial stability and enhances peace of mind. 
 It relieves the government’s burden of providing social protection services to citizens. 
 It promotes trade and commerce, supporting businesses and economic growth. 
 It mobilises domestic savings. 
 It increases effective distribution of capital, advancing the development of financial 
services. 
According to Rejda and McNamara (2014:49), the major social and economic purposes of 
insurance are the following: 
 Indemnification allows the insured to be placed back to their former financial position 
after the loss occurs. 
 Fear is reduced before and after the loss, as individuals are adequately covered in the 
event of a loss occurring. 
 The insurance industry is an important source of funds for capital investment and 
accumulation. 
 Insurance companies employ a wide variety of loss-prevention personnel and are also 
actively involved in loss-prevention programmes. 
 Insurance enhances a person’s credit and makes the borrower a better credit risk. 
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It is emphasised that it is a legal requirement for all parties transacting in the context of an 
insurance contract to act in utmost good faith toward one another throughout the existence of 
the contract. This obliges them to reciprocally disclose all material information known to them. 
Lack of good faith, however, is not by implication an indicator of fraud. Fraudulent activity by 
either party is confirmed by the presence of a material misrepresentation, intent to deceive and 
the aim of gaining an unauthorised benefit (Bland, 1999:16; Viaene & Dedene, 2004:314). 
A discussion on contextualising insurance fraud is presented next. 
2.6.2 Contextualising insurance fraud 
Lesch and Byars (2008:412) define insurance fraud as “a deliberate deception perpetrated 
against or by an insurance company or agent for the purpose of financial gain.” Insurance fraud 
has existed ever since the concept of insurance was introduced (Dalko, 2017:644). Fraudulent 
claims account for a significant portion of all claims received by insurers, and cost billions 
annually. Insurance fraud arises when the insurer is unable to conclude whether claimed 
accidents really happened. In that instance, policyholders have an incentive to claim even if the 
incident did not occur (Okura, 2013:121). Types of insurance fraud are diverse and occur in all 
areas of insurance. Insurance crimes also range in severity, from slightly exaggerating claims to 
deliberately causing accidents or damages. Fraudulent insurance activities also affect the lives 
of innocent people, both directly through accidental or purposeful injury or damage, and 
indirectly through causing insurance premiums to be higher. A survey conducted by Ernst and 
Young (2011:2) indicates that insurance fraud poses a significant problem, and governments 
and other organisations are making efforts to deter such activities. 
Insurance Europe (2013:7) emphasises that fraud affects all types of insurance, including non-
life insurance, life insurance, protection cover and health insurance. Insurance Europe further 
illustrates that insurance fraud occurs when untruthful or incomplete information is provided on 
application and proposal forms, or when a claim is submitted with an intention to gain benefit 
under the insurance contract. 
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Figure 2.2: Insurance process flow chart: Structured and unstructured data 
 
(Chetty, 2014:5)  
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Figure 2.2 above depicts the insurance process of the different types of fraud that occur from 
the underwriting phase until claim finalisation stages, as well as the entities involved. 
An overview of the different types of short-term insurance fraud follows for discussion. 
 
 
2.6.3 Types of short-term insurance fraud 
The types of short-term insurance fraud include claims following events that did not happen, for 
example theft, burglary and hijacking, as well as inflated claims, which involve claiming for 
more expensive items than what were actually lost. In a well-explained breakdown, Kopel 
(2012:241) lays out the three different types of fraud in the context of insurance policies as 
follows: 
 Fabricated claim: “When the insured suffers no actual loss or no loss covered on the 
insurance policy. The insured lies or may even cause the loss and later fraudulently 
represents to the insurer that the loss was caused by an event specified on the policy.” 
 Exaggerated claim: “When the insured suffers an actual loss but claims for a larger 
amount. This involves an exaggeration of the loss enabling the insured to claim more 
than the actual loss.” 
 Valid claim accompanied by fraudulent means: “This is the least serious form of a 
fraudulent claim which involves a technical or petty fraud designed to reduce delay in 
payment.” 
According to the researcher inflated claims are the most prevalent type of insurance crime but 
have a low rand value per incident. There are fewer incidents of organised insurance crime, but 
the rand value is substantially higher. Both organised and opportunistic insurance crime are 
extremely complex to investigate and to police.  
Rose (2008:2) provides a definition of opportunistic and professional fraud as follows: 
 Opportunistic fraud “is usually perpetrated by an individual who simply has a chance 
to inflate a claim or get an exaggerated estimate for losses or repairs from his or her 
insurance company.” Opportunistic insurance crime is usually perpetrated by an 
individual who increases the value of an item or claims for an item not lost or that he or 
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she did not own when a legitimate loss occurs; example a client claims for a Sony 
PlayStation 3, he or she did not own when submitting a claim for a legitimate burglary 
claim. This is commonly referred to as inflated claims or claim padding. 
 Professional fraud “is often perpetrated by organized groups with multiple, false 
identities, targeting multiple organizations or brands.” Planned or organised insurance 
crime is usually perpetrated by a group of individuals who work together to defraud 
insurers, for example, corruption between supplier and assessor. The assessor allows the 
supplier to over quote and, in return, the assessor receives a kickback.  
Short-term insurance fraud is committed both internally and externally. Insurance crime is 
generally committed by the following: policyholders, brokers, suppliers, employees and 
insurance companies. The types of crimes committed by each group differ and can be classified 
as follows: 
 Policyholders: False claims, inflated claims, underwriting fraud, backdating of cover. 
 Brokers: Theft of premiums, false claims, corruption. 
 Suppliers: Corruption, false/fictious invoices, false claims, inflated repair costs. 
 Insurers: Policy churning, mis-selling. 
 Employees: Corruption, false claims, theft, electronic funds transfer fraud, unethical 
conduct (Viaene & Dedene, 2004:315). 
Santam case studies relating to broker fraud are as follows: 
 In 2016, an employee of a brokerage was investigated and confessed to incepting 20 
fictitious policies and subsequently creating false damage reports, quotations and 
invoices alleging that various appliances were damaged because of lightning. The 
fraudster submitted 137 false claims against these bogus policies, totalling R1.3 million. 
The case was handled by the Commercial Crime Court and the employee was convicted. 
 In 2013, Santam investigated a case where the policyholder trusted a broker and paid 
over R700 000 as part of annual premiums over a five-year period. The broker forged 
the policy, creating an impression that the client had a valid policy. It was only when the 
client had a windscreen claim that he became aware that he did not have insurance and 
had been defrauded. Further investigation revealed more incidents using the same MO. 
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Consequently, the broker confessed that she committed insurance fraud to support her 
drug habit. 
Participants were asked the following question: Name the different types of short-term insurance 
fraud that you typically investigate? The purpose of this question was to obtain an overview of 
the common types of insurance fraud. In summary, the participants responded to the question as 
follows: 
 All the participants confirmed investigating false, fraudulent and inflated claims. They 
provided examples of the types of fraud cases normally investigated as follows: 
- staged accidents; 
- fast-track claims; 
- false theft of motor vehicles and hijacking; 
- driving under the influence (non-disclosure); 
- false third-party claims; 
- goods in transit (submitting false information); 
- identity fraud; 
- false policies; 
- premium theft; 
- loss prior to policy inception; 
- backdating of cover; 
- bribes and kickbacks; 
- financial statement fraud; 
- procurement fraud; 
- duplicate claims;  
- dual insurance;  
- underwriting fraud; 
- BEE fronting; 
- syndicate operations; 
- fabricated or false invoicing; and 
- collusion with suppliers. 
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Various case studies regarding short-term insurance fraud investigations are presented next. 
Short-term insurance fraud is divided into two categories (Deloitte, 2012; Lesch & Byars, 
2008:412), namely hard fraud and soft fraud.  
Hard fraud occurs when a person deliberately plans or invents a loss, such as a collision, false 
hijacking or fire that is covered by his or her insurance policy in order to receive financial benefit 
for the damages. A hard fraud scheme is sometimes relative to syndicates and involves millions. 
Case study 1 
“Project Mavis” is a current investigation managed by the ICB involving the actions of a large 
number of individuals responsible for incepting policies at various short-term insurers and 
planning staged accidents with the purpose of obtaining rental vehicles in the process. The 
investigation has revealed that this fraud was orchestrated by 10 syndicates using the same MO 
operating in specific areas within KZN. These criminals identified opportunities which were 
later exploited for financial benefit. The investigation involves verifying information, 
conducting interviews, obtaining statements and networking between investigators from various 
car rental companies, affected member companies and the SAPS (Insurance Crime Bureau, 
2017). 
Case study 2 
“Multiple policy disorder – Lion of Africa.” The perpetrator incepted policies at various insurers 
at the same time, making use of stolen identities or of those belonging to family members. The 
MO included submitting claims for building-related damages and all-risk items such as 
prescription spectacles and laptops. He would subsequently avoid the insurance company, using 
the excuse of lack of service, so that he could repair or replace items by himself. He later 
submitted false invoices in return for a cash settlement. This MO is common, but the case is also 
unique because it involved one individual, using 30 identities, defrauding four major insurers 
with an estimated loss of over R1 million (Krige, 2013:107). 
Soft fraud is more common and is sometimes referred to as opportunistic fraud. It involves 
inflation of a valid claim or the submission of false information when obtaining a new insurance 
policy in order to obtain a lower premium (Deloitte, 2012; Lesch & Byars, 2008:412). 
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Case study 3 
An example of a case study that the researcher investigated involved Mr X who obtained a 
policy and alerted Santam that his adult son, Y, who lived with him, did not have a valid driver’s 
license. The policy clearly indicated that no claim for a loss or injury would be entertained if Y 
were driving the insured vehicle in the event of an accident. However, after Y had crashed his 
father’s car by driving into a telephone pole, his father lied and stated that he had been the driver 
when the loss occurred.  
According to the researcher, some indicators of claims being fraudulent include the following: 
 a claim being submitted within a short period after the policy was incepted,  
 the insured having a history of insurance claims/losses,  
 identification of patterns of claims (e.g., repeated claims for similar losses),  
 when the insured is unable to provide reasonable proof of ownership,  
 vague information provided by policyholders,  
 when there is continuous pressure for the insurer to settle the claim, 
Information and statistics regarding the cost of insurance fraud follow for discussion. 
2.7 THE COST OF SHORT-TERM INSURANCE FRAUD  
The actual financial loss attributed to insurance fraud is unknown; it is difficult to measure 
insurance fraud because so much goes undetected. The statistics on insurance fraud obtained 
throughout the world are only estimates, but the impact is known to be substantial. Various 
organisations and insurance companies assert that it is extremely difficult to determine the exact 
value of money stolen through insurance fraud. Insurance fraud is designed by fraudsters to be 
undetectable in comparison to visible crimes such as robbery and murder (Brooks, Button, 
Lewis & Shepherd, 2015:189).  
The insurance industry ranks the highest amongst industry sectors who report fraud 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). In South Africa, the South African Insurance Association 
estimates that approximately 10% of claims contain an element of fraud, which equates to 
between R2 billion and R3 billion a year. The SAICB reports that fraudulent claims pertaining 
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to laptops, cell phones and motor vehicles increased by as much as 10-12% during 2010. KPMG, 
which has been responsible for conducting a global insurance fraud survey for the past 21 years, 
has rated South Africa as a country with the second-highest significant increase in fraudulent 
claims since the outset of the economic recession (Le Roux & Whisgary, 2011).  
Insurance fraud has become prevalent globally. The National Insurance Crime Bureau reported 
that, in 2011, questionable claims had exceeded 100 000 referrals for the first time and had 
increased by 19% compared to 2009 (Deloitte, 2012). 
The economic impact of fraud is enormous. The Coalition Against Insurance Fraud estimates 
that fraud for all types of insurance costs 80 billion dollars annually, making it the second largest 
economic crime in the United States (Deloitte, 2012). 
Participants were asked the following question: In your opinion, can the application of modus 
operandi information in short-term insurance fraud investigation decrease the financial loss 
attributed to short-term insurance fraud? The purpose of this question was to assess 
participants’ knowledge on the effect of the use of MO information on the financial loss ascribed 
to short-term insurance fraud. The participants’ responses to the question are summarised as 
follows: 
 Sixteen participants were in agreement that the application of MO information in short-
term insurance fraud investigation would significantly decrease the financial loss 
attributed to short-term insurance fraud. These participants emphasised that MO 
information would assist with early detection and can also help to implement controls to 
mitigate fraud risks. Some participants were of the view that early detection would lead 
to proactive investigation and prevention of future fraud, which would ultimately limit 
financial losses due to the settlement of fraudulent claims. 
 In contrast to the participants mentioned in the point above, two participants were of the 
opinion that the application of MO information in short-term insurance fraud 
investigation would not decrease the financial loss attributed to short-term insurance 
fraud. This opinion was supported by their view that fraudsters are skilled at adapting 
MOs – they can therefore respond and create new opportunities for committing fraud, 
making detection very difficult. 
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In relation to the above literature on the cost of short-term insurance fraud, it appears from the 
participant’s responses that they acknowledged the importance of applying MO information 
during the investigation of short-term insurance fraud. 
The reasons why people commit short-term insurance fraud follow for discussion. 
2.8 REASONS WHY PEOPLE COMMIT FRAUD 
According to Wells (2005:13), there is no single reason why people commit fraud. Based on the 
research done by Donald Cressey and his theory of the fraud triangle, it is believed that fraud is 
likely to result of a combination of three factors, namely, motivation, opportunity and 
rationalisation. 
 Motivation is based on greed or need, for example, resulting from financial difficulties. 
 Opportunity relies on weak internal controls, poor security, and fear of exposure and 
detection. 
 Rationalisation is when the actions taken are assumed necessary for the business, 
harmless because the victim is large enough to absorb the impact or justified because the 
wrongdoer feels aggrieved. 
According to Kassem and Higson (2012:191), critics argue that the fraud triangle in isolation 
cannot explain fraud because rationalisation and pressure are factors that cannot be observed. 
Morley, Ball and Ormerod (2006:163) suggest that “motivations to commit fraud vary”. 
Brinkmann and Lentz (2006:322) explain that opportunistic individuals may perceive insurance 
fraud as being a victimless crime and would therefore indulge in submitting a fraudulent claim 
as a means of recovering their premiums. 
Tennyson (1997 & 2002; as quoted by Su & Tseng, 2013:38) found that the following factors 
influence the client’s intention to commit fraud: 
 the client’s perceptions towards insurance companies; 
 the relationship that exists between the client and insurer; 
 the client’s insurance experience; and 
 the client’s tolerance for insurance fraud  
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Criminal networks, on the other hand, may use fraud as a regular source to generate an income. 
Financial crime has accelerated over time due to the quantity and complexity of the tools 
available, cheap and user-friendly technology, and perpetual innovation (Nardo, 2004:139).  
Silverstone, Sheetz, Pedneault and Rudewicz (2012:32) explain that society perceives fraud to 
be a victimless crime, and that governments and businesses are so wealthy that the money taken 
fraudulently will not be missed. It is also perceived that fraud is an easy way to get money 
without receiving severe punishment. From the researcher’s experience during investigation, 
information received from perpetrators reveals that the first attempt is generally motivated by 
need due to some sort of financial pressure, for example, medical bills, school fees, gambling 
or drug addiction. Explanations regarding the continuation include loopholes identified which 
made it easy, stupidity, thinking that they would not be caught out, trying to maintain a lifestyle 
and greed.  
The factors influencing the increase of short-term insurance fraud follow for discussion. 
2.9 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE INCREASE OF SHORT-TERM INSURANCE 
FRAUD 
Corporate fraud is steadfast, forming a worldwide challenge for senior management and board 
members. Poorly designed internal controls are deemed to be weak and are not obeyed by 
employees (KPMG, 2016:10). Morley et al. (2006:167) raise concern that the modern wave of 
technological and process solutions seems to have been developed without a full understanding 
of claims handling and investigation staff within the insurance industry. These systems focus 
upon identifying irregularities, with the repercussion that claims handling staff are not 
themselves good at spotting anomalies in claims data. 
This view is supported by Ellis and Gildenhuys (2002:31), who explain that quantities of 
intelligence and sophisticated investigative tools remain just that and emphasise that “there is 
no substitute for the human mind, supported by proper training and experience”. These authors 
further confirm that technology can fast-track an investigation, but nothing can replace “gut 
feel” combined with physical interaction of witnesses and evidence. Bologna and Shaw (1997:2) 
emphasise the fact that fraud is most likely to occur in environments where motives, 
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opportunities, means and methods flourish. Bologna and Shaw believe that the following 
conditions offer exposure of risk for fraud to occur: 
 Internal controls are absent, weak or loosely enforced. 
 Employees are hired without due consideration for their honesty and integrity. 
 Employees are poorly managed, exploited, abused or placed under great stress to 
accomplish financial goals and objectives. 
 Management models are themselves corrupt, inefficient or incompetent. 
 There are employees with financial problems, such as alcoholism, drug abuse, gambling 
or expensive tastes. 
 A history or tradition of corruption exists within the environment. 
 The company has fallen on hard times and is losing money. 
 Internal audit and security resources are inadequate. 
 
According to Rose (2008:2), many insurers are of the opinion that it is too expensive to detect 
fraud and it has therefore become an accepted norm that a certain amount of fraud loss is a 
standard cost of doing business. There is an increased focus on customer satisfaction with a 
reluctance to stall claims for further investigation. Rose emphasises that insurance companies 
operate data systems in “silos”, making it very difficult for companies to identify separate 
entities that are operating in collusion or even identifying patterns that would only be suspicious 
when taking all information into account. 
 
Participants were asked the following question: In your opinion, can modus operandi 
information play a role in identifying irregularities in short-term insurance claims? The purpose 
of this question was to test participants’ knowledge in the application of MO information with 
the aim of identifying irregularities pertaining to short-term insurance claims. 
All the participants agreed that MO information played a role in identifying irregularities of 
short-term insurance claims. The participants provided the following reasons in support of their 
view: 
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 MO information can be integrated into underwriting and claims processes, which will 
help to underwrite new policies properly and segment and flag high-risk claims. 
 The more information is collected on MO, the easier it is to identify irregularities and 
trends, for example, dishonest claims. 
 If data are captured correctly, shared amongst the industry role players and compared 
accurately, irregularities can be highlighted at policy acceptance stage. 
 Fraudsters learn from each other; therefore, MO information is valuable in detecting 
future fraudulent claims. 
In relation to the above literature on factors influencing the increase of short-term insurance 
fraud, it appears from the participants’ responses that they were of the view that MO information 
plays an important role in identifying irregularities of short-term insurance claims. 
The following are reasons why insurance fraud is increasing so drastically (Coalition Against 
Insurance Fraud, [s.a.): 
 Some insurance companies unconsciously encourage fraud by settling suspicious claims 
easily. They believe that it is cheaper to pay the claim than to fight it in court or to face 
lawsuits due to bad faith. 
 Some policyholders believe that insurance fraud is a low-risk crime with a high financial 
benefit in comparison to crimes such as armed robbery or drug trafficking. 
 Investigating officers do not understand the short-term insurance industry and it is 
therefore difficult for them to investigate cases pertaining to insurance fraud. 
 Prosecutors give priority to more serious crimes and sometimes believe that insurance 
crimes are too complex and technical to successfully prosecute. 
 People tend to have a tolerance for insurance fraud and many policyholders believe that 
insurance fraud is justified. 
An overview on the profile of an insurance fraudster is discussed in the subsequent section. 
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2.10 THE PROFILE OF AN INSURANCE FRAUDSTER  
According to Bekerian and Jackson (1997:2) offender profiling, criminal personality profiling 
and specific profile analysis are terms that are used to define the same technique, the basic 
perception remains the same.  Study of the behaviour demonstrated at the crime scene or a series 
of similar crimes allows inferences to be made about the possible offender. 
Clarke (as quoted by Morley et al., 2006:163) explains there are also several types of fraudsters. 
These include “the opportunist”, “the amateur” and “the professional”.  
 The opportunist is the type of fraudster who would normally take advantage of a 
genuine loss, for example, by claiming for additional items that were not stolen during a 
burglary. 
 The amateur refers to the fraudster who would indulge in opportunistic fraud, for 
example, submitting a claim for stolen items resulting from a burglary that did not even 
occur. 
 The professional is the most serious of the fraudsters and would engage in systematic 
frauds individually or as part of a syndicate. 
A worldwide survey conducted by KPMG (2016:7) revealed that the perpetrator of fraud is 
normally a man aged between 36 and 55, employed at the victim organisation, with more than 
six years of service, who has an executive position in operations, finance or general 
management. This statement is supported by Crumbley, Heitger and Smith (2011:3071), who 
point out that a study conducted by Ernst & Young of leading companies and public bodies in 
32 countries found that more than 50% have been victims of fraud, with 84% of total losses 
being attributed to staff and 50% of larger, more serious, fraud being committed by the 
organisation’s own management. According to Sutherland (1949:189) high levels of fraud 
committed by management is attributed to the fact that they are placed in positions of trust and 
are given more authority than middle management and junior staff in respect of certain 
decisions, payments and so on. This is seen as a loophole as there is generally no or poor 
oversight in respect of their functions. 
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Figure 2.3: Fundamental characteristics of a fraudster 
 
(KPMG, 2016:6) 
In this regard the participants were first asked the following question: According to you, can 
modus operandi information be used to profile a short-term insurance fraudster? The purpose 
of this question was to understand participants’ views on whether the profile of a short-term 
insurance fraudster could be influenced by MO information. The participants’ responses to the 
question are summarised as follows: 
 Fifteen participants agreed that MO information could be used to profile a short-term 
insurance fraudster. 
 Seven participants were of the view that, if detailed MO information was obtained, a 
fraudster could be profiled according to various elements, such as age, gender, 
geographic area, ethnic group, employment and qualification. 
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 Three participants stated that profiling a fraudster could be very beneficial, as 
information could be shared throughout the short-term insurance industry, which could 
result in the fraudster being blacklisted. 
 Another participant was of the opinion that it would be very difficult to profile a fraudster 
using MO information in an instance where a stolen identity is used. 
 One participant pointed out that MO information could assist to identify variables of a 
potential fraudster, for instance:  
- abrupt tone of voice; 
- not talking for lengthy periods of time; 
- being from a certain area; 
- using a common bank account; and 
- making calls from a common cell phone number. 
 In contrast to the participants mentioned above, one participant did not agree that MO 
information could be used to profile a short-term insurance fraudster. His view was 
supported by the fact that fraudsters are skilled and, when detected, they tend to use 
different identities and even change their pattern of behaviour. 
Secondly, participants were asked the following question: According to you, can modus 
operandi information assist to identify fraudsters? The purpose of this question was to establish 
whether MO information assisted participants to identify fraudsters. In summary, the 
participants responded to the questions as follows: 
- Ten participants were of the opinion that MO information was very useful and, if 
used effectively, it could identify crime trends and fraudsters as they generally use 
the same methods to commit fraud. 
- Three participants were of the view that, with the use of a database, MO information 
could be used during underwriting and claims processing to link policies to 
fraudsters and syndicates. 
-  Four participants emphasised the importance of detailed and complete MO-related 
information to assist in enhancing controls within the organisation and preventing 
similar future occurrences. 
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- In contrast to the other participants, one participant was of the opinion that both 
behavioural and transactional MO needed to be considered when trying to identify 
fraudsters. 
In relation to the above literature on the profile of a short-term insurance fraudster, it appears 
from the participants’ responses that they strongly supported the importance of MO information 
in aiding to profile a short-term insurance fraudster and agree that MO information has 
tremendous value in assisting to identify fraudsters. 
The impact of short-term insurance fraud follows for discussion. 
2.11 THE IMPACT OF SHORT-TERM INSURANCE FRAUD 
Babalola and Yusuf (2009:420) state that the cost of insurance is increased due to fraud. Fraud 
also threatens the financial stability of insurers and negatively impacts the convenience of 
insurance. Individuals that are dishonest and submit fraudulent claims are a serious problem for 
the insurance industry and for society. Insurance fraud is pervasive and costly. Policyholders 
are negatively impacted by this and are the ultimate group that pay for these crimes through 
increased premiums (Tseng, 2016:353). 
The key priority for insurers is to effectively detect and reduce insurance fraud. Insurance fraud 
has serious consequences for those found guilty of committing fraud as well as honest 
policyholders who have to pay higher premiums due to the actions of these fraudsters. Insurance 
fraud can therefore not be regarded as a victimless crime. The cost of investigating suspected 
fraud has an impact on the insurance premiums charged. Investigations also result in time delays, 
not allowing the insurer to settle a genuine claim quickly. Recent studies have also pointed out 
that insurance fraud funds and facilitates other serious crime (Insurance Europe, 2013:17). 
Insurance fraud has more severe consequences beyond the associated monetary losses (Dearden, 
2016:88). The effects infiltrate throughout society. Large corporates suffer reputational damage, 
while small- and medium-sized businesses risk going out of business, affecting owners, 
employees and their families, and damaging the country’s economy. Some victims have been 
known to suffer emotional trauma and even commit suicide (Dearden, 2016:88). 
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Remedies to curb insurance fraud follow for discussion. 
2.12 REMEDIES TO CURB INSURANCE FRAUD 
According to the researcher, fraud investigations often originate after an allegation is received 
from an anonymous tip-off. This is generally received from inside the organisation, although 
external tip-offs are not unusual. Many fraud incidents are initially discovered by accident, 
perhaps as result of an audit, job change, resignation, or a staff member being on leave or booked 
off sick. Fraud is seldom discovered deliberately, as not enough emphasis is placed on the 
implementation of proactive fraud detection programmes. 
According to Lees (2012: 9-11), key techniques for detecting and preventing fraud include: 
 developing a sound ethical culture; 
 periodically assessing fraud risk; 
 fraud risk training and awareness; 
 reporting mechanisms and whistle-blowing; and 
 sound internal control systems. 
Technology plays a vital role in fraud prevention, but the majority of insurers agree that no 
single technology is adequate. A combination of techniques, methods and skills is required to 
detect both opportunistic and organised fraud. Automated red flags are the first line of defence 
employed by most insurers (Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, 2014:2). The researcher states 
that insurers have implemented various solutions, including, amongst others, the establishment 
of in-house investigation teams to conduct merit assessments and investigate fraud, modifying 
policy conditions to include forfeiture clauses in case the claim is fraudulent, using predictive 
analytics software to identify potential fraudulent claims, and establishing industry bodies to 
ensure that there is a platform to share information. 
The following techniques are commonly used to prevent and detect fraud in the insurance 
industry: 
 Rules and red flags are used to identify specific patterns and highlight activities that look 
suspicious. 
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 Data collectively obtained with the support of other database subscribers broaden 
information in claims investigations. 
 Anomalies that exceed the norm and threshold for a particular claim’s benchmark are 
reported. 
 Large volumes of adjudicated claims are examined to find discrepancies. 
 Predictive modelling – data mining tools are used to build models to produce fraud-
propensity scores, rules and red flags. 
 Layered voice analysis is used to identify stress levels in claimant interviews. 
Participants were asked the following question: Do you apply modus operandi information as a 
key technique for detecting and preventing short-term insurance fraud? The purpose of this 
question was to determine whether participants used MO information to detect and prevent 
short-term insurance fraud.  
All 18 participants stated that they applied MO information as a technique during the 
investigation of short-term insurance fraud. Eight participants elaborated and provided the 
following reasons for their answer: 
 Four participants indicated that link analysis was used to identify patterns and link claims 
if similar scenarios were picked up. 
 One participant specified that MO information was integrated into claims processes to 
segment claims from low- to high-risk, aiding in detecting and preventing short-term 
insurance fraud. 
 Another participant was of the opinion that the effective use of MO during investigations 
was solely based on the expertise of the investigator to conduct a thorough investigation 
by doing the necessary checks to uncover crime patterns involving various claims and 
policies. 
 In contrast to this, one participant pointed out that the use of MO information during 
investigations could be improved and enhanced. He stated that there was a reluctance to 
share information, which impeded the true success that this technique could offer. 
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 Another participant confirmed that, when fraudsters were identified by MO information, 
their details were flagged on the system, preventing them from returning to submit more 
fraudulent claims. 
In relation to the above literature on remedies to curb insurance fraud, it is evident from the 
feedback received from the participants to the abovementioned question that these participants 
had identified the value of applying MO as a key technique during the investigation of short-
term insurance fraud, as well as the problems restricting the efficient use of MO information. 
2.13 SUMMARY 
Insurance fraud is a global epidemic that harms corporate reputations, costs the insurance 
industry millions and ruins lives. It is a heavy financial and moral burden on society. Effective 
use of MO information can assist in identifying criminal activity across the insurance industry. 
Collective efforts, skills and knowledge-sharing, in conjunction with the optimal use of 
available data systems, will aid in proactive insurance fraud detection. Identifying and 
investigating crime rings or syndicates will have a positive impact on the reduction of insurance 
fraud. 
The factors influencing MO as well as the value of MO when used to link cases were discussed 
in this chapter. The chapter also included the purpose of insurance and the impact of insurance 
fraud. The experience of the researcher was illustrated by case studies about substantiation of 
insurance fraud, profiles of a fraudster and measures taken to combat insurance fraud. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, and includes findings and 
recommendations identified from the interviews. 
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CHAPTER 3 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarises Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the overview of literature and the experience 
of the researcher in the field of short-term insurance fraud investigation, after which relevant 
findings and recommendations are presented based on the outcome of the interviews discussed 
in Chapter 2. The reason to conduct research on this topic was to enhance the knowledge of 
forensic investigators at Santam and MiWay with regard to the value of applying MO 
information as an important investigative tool during the investigation of short-term insurance 
fraud. 
The primary purpose of this study was to discover, identify and emphasise the value of the 
application of MO information as a forensic investigation method in order to determine the 
significance of this method in the investigation of short-term insurance fraud at forensic 
departments across all insurers.  
The secondary purpose of this research was to provide well-researched and realistic information 
to forensic investigators to indicate that MO should be efficiently used as a tool that could add 
value to short-term insurance fraud investigations. 
The research conducted stresses the impact of insurance fraud internationally and within the 
South African short-term insurance industry, and highlights the importance of using MO 
information during investigations to reduce losses attributed to short-term insurance fraud. Over 
the years, MO has been successfully utilised by investigators globally to identify serial offenders 
and link multiple cases. The researcher is therefore of the opinion that, if applied effectively, it 
could significantly decrease short-term insurance fraud. 
The research question, namely, What is the value of applying modus operandi information as a 
forensic investigation method in the investigation of short-term insurance fraud? allowed the 
researcher to concentrate on the identified problem and make certain that the findings and 
recommendations of the study relate to the research problem. The findings of this study relate 
directly to the questions asked during the interviews. 
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3.2 FINDINGS 
The following findings are based on the information obtained from the literature study, the 
researcher’s broad experience as a forensic investigator and the interviews with the participants. 
3.2.1 Findings on the investigation of insurance fraud 
 Research has identified insurance fraud to be a fundamental challenge as it has become 
a global epidemic that is estimated to cost the short-term insurance industry billions 
annually. 
 The actual loss attributed to insurance fraud is difficult to measure as so much goes 
undetected, yet the impact is known to be substantial. 
 Research confirms that no recent surveys have been conducted in South Africa to 
measure the true extent of losses suffered by short-term insurers due to fraud. 
 Innocent policyholders fall victim to paying higher monthly premiums due to the impact 
of insurance fraud. 
 Fraudsters and criminal groups keep abreast of the latest trends and technology, are 
skilled at adapting their MO and can therefore respond and create new opportunities for 
committing fraud, making detection very difficult. 
 The majority of the participants confirmed use of an internal database as well as making 
use of the ICB to channel enquiries, as well as verify and share information with other 
short-term insurers in the industry as a combined effort to detect and prevent insurance 
fraud. 
 Data analysis can be restrictive as it is limited to the company database and the quality 
of the data captured. Although the ICB assists with sharing information across the short-
term insurance industry, this information is still not comprehensive as not all short-term 
insurers are members of the ICB. 
 Data analysis can be a challenge due to multiple systems being used by the insurer and 
its subsidiaries which are not integrated. This is found mostly in historical businesses 
and, as a result, the sharing of such data is restricted. 
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 There is difficulty in linking systems with other insurers due to different operating 
technology, and interaction with the ICB takes time as there is an absence of a direct 
automated process linking to other insurers. 
 Short-term insurers work in silos and seldom share MO information. There is a need for 
more concerted efforts between insurers to share information that will assist in 
identifying trends. The reluctance of short-term insurers to share MO information, due 
to legislation, impedes the true success that the MO technique can offer. 
 Not all short-term insurers report criminal cases to the authorities, due to various reasons 
such as reputational damage, the fraudulent amount vs. costs and resources involved, 
and the belief that insurance fraud is not seen as a priority crime by the SAPS and 
National Prosecuting Authority. 
 Tolerance for fraud is a contributing factor that increases criminal activity as well as 
fraud within the short-term insurance industry. This is compounded by the fact that the 
authorities do not have sufficient knowledge, skills and resources to deal with insurance 
fraud. 
 Short-term insurance fraud, which includes opportunistic or professional fraud relating 
to false and inflated claims, is committed by four categories of perpetrators, namely, 
clients, brokers, suppliers and employees. 
 The majority of the participants were of the opinion that the absence of processes and 
controls or weak processes and controls within the environment created loopholes that 
influenced a short-term insurance fraudster’s MO. 
 Research confirms that a short-term insurance fraudster’s MO is influenced by 
opportunity, financial pressure and rationalisation. 
 Most short-term insurers and financial institutions are constantly looking for innovative 
ways to try to detect, prevent and respond to insurance fraud. 
3.2.2 Findings on the application of modus operandi in insurance fraud investigations 
 All the participants agreed that there was definite value in applying MO information as 
a forensic investigation method during the investigation of short-term insurance fraud.  
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 Collated MO information assists in detecting control breakdowns in the underwriting, 
claims, broker and service provider environments, and helps develop effective controls 
to prevent fraud. 
 MO is a specialised investigative tool that requires skilled staff, proper training, 
understanding, determination and endurance. 
 Participants agreed that the use of MO could identify patterns and link various claims to 
the same individual or group of individuals. 
 Although there are databases that are currently used by the short-term insurance industry 
to capture certain information and link individuals to common bank account numbers, 
identity numbers, registration numbers, cell phone numbers and addresses, there is no 
system that can accurately track and link fraudulent claims or organised groups based on 
specific MO information. 
 Linking claims or fraudsters using MO information can sometimes become challenging 
as different staff members work with various claims and clients, and information is 
usually only shared during meetings and networking sessions. 
 Knowledge, experience, training and skill are important factors in identifying MO during 
investigations. MO identification makes the investigation process easier and reduces 
turnaround times in resolving investigations. 
 Proper investigation and collection of MO information enables forensic investigators to 
conduct more comprehensive interviews. 
 The application of MO information enables the identification of all transactions, 
allowing more comprehensive investigations to be carried out. 
 MO assists in detecting more fraudulent claims than initially reported and the 
intelligence can be used to identify crime patterns. 
 MO information circulated via the ICB allows for the successful identification of 
syndicates targeting various insurers, which also prevents insurers from paying false 
claims. 
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 Research has confirmed that MO information plays an important role in identifying 
irregularities in short-term insurance claims.  
 Some participants confirmed that records were kept of MO information pertaining to 
short-term insurance fraud. Information was stored in their internal database and shared 
with the ICB. 
 Other participants indicated that, although records were kept of information, it was either 
captured on a case management system, on spreadsheets or in the form of working 
papers, and that no formal records containing accurate MO information were available. 
Additionally, these records were not freely available to other insurers as they were bound 
by confidentiality. 
 Both behavioural and transactional MO need to be considered when trying to identify 
fraudsters. MO information is very useful and, if used effectively, it can identify crime 
trends and fraudsters as they generally use the same methods to commit fraud. 
 The application of MO information in short-term insurance fraud investigation will 
significantly decrease the financial loss attributed to short-term insurance fraud and, 
ultimately, feed back to the policyholder as premium increases would be managed. 
 MO information will assist with early detection and can also help to implement controls 
to mitigate fraud risks, which will lead to proactive investigation and prevention of fraud. 
 MO information can assist in identifying variables of a potential fraudster, for example, 
abrupt tone of voice, not talking for lengthy periods of time, being from a certain area, 
or using a common bank account, telephone number, fax number or email address. 
 Detailed MO information can be used to profile a fraudster according to various 
elements, for example, age, gender, geographic area, ethnic group, employment and 
qualification. 
 Profiling a fraudster based on MO can be beneficial as information can be shared 
throughout the short-term insurance industry, which can result in fraudsters being 
identified, investigated and blacklisted. 
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 The effective use of MO as a tool during investigations is based on the expertise of the 
investigator to conduct a thorough investigation by doing the necessary checks to 
uncover crime patterns involving various claims and policies. 
 Some forensic investigators deal with investigations on a case-to-case basis and fail to 
conduct additional checks and trace fraudsters. In such cases, the details of the fraudster 
are not captured on the database, making it impossible to identify other links. 
 The use of MO as an investigative tool can be improved and enhanced by the forensic 
investigators at both Santam and MiWay. 
3.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings of the research, the following recommendations are made: 
3.3.1 Recommendations on the investigation of insurance fraud 
 There must be collaboration. All divisions of the private sector must work together by 
sharing intelligence on fraudsters, developing cross-cutting capabilities, initiating joint 
projects and using data analytics.  
 All short-term insurers should adopt a zero-tolerance attitude towards insurance fraud 
by reporting criminal cases against fraudsters who submit fraudulent claims as a 
preventive measure, regardless of whether it is an actual or potential loss that is suffered 
by the insurer. 
 Fraudsters should be “named and shamed”. This will serve as a good deterrence 
mechanism for those thinking of committing fraud. 
 Information pertaining to MO should be included in fraud awareness training sessions, 
as it is of vital importance that staff are made aware of fraud trends and syndicated 
operations involving the same MO. 
 Insurance companies should implement proper vetting processes in respect of clients, 
suppliers, brokers and staff to ensure the recruitment of trustworthy and ethical business 
partners, policyholders and employees. 
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 Continuous communication and knowledge-sharing amongst forensic departments at 
various insurers are critical for detecting and efficiently investigating suspicious activity 
that may involve organised crime by establishing better networking platforms for 
investigators. 
 The implementation of robust systems and proper processes will discourage fraudsters 
from attempting to submit fraudulent claims. 
 Forensic investigators need to refrain from working in silos and dealing with 
investigations on a case-to-case basis, but should instead spend time and resources on 
sharing crime information, linking cases and looking for clusters of criminal activity 
involving the same MO.  
 In order to maintain effective databases, investigators need to feed the database by 
providing pertinent information that can be used to identify fraud trends and the MO 
used by perpetrators so that all entities can benefit and contribute to the fight against 
short-term insurance fraud. 
 An ICB-supported centralised platform where all investigators have access to search and 
add to a database could effectively contribute to detecting and preventing insurance fraud 
on a larger scale.  
3.3.2 Recommendations on the application of modus operandi in insurance fraud 
investigations  
 Insurance companies should create a human risk database, identifying and listing clients 
that either committed fraud or are a moral risk, preventing them from moving to another 
insurer and committing the same offence.  
 Employees identified as fraud-reporting champions in the insurance industry should be 
utilised as mentors and training facilitators to the rest of their colleagues in the 
application of MO to identify and report incidents of fraud. 
 The use of MO as an investigative tool in the insurance industry should become a 
standard way of working, resulting in an instrumental service in the collection of data to 
be shared throughout the insurance industry. 
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 International research on MO within the insurance sector should be studied and 
examined, this knowledge can be used in South Africa to identify similar trends and 
implement preventative measures. 
 Forensic investigators at Santam and MiWay should be trained in basic application of 
MO during their investigations. They should also be educated about the value that MO 
information could add to linking cases and identifying syndicates. 
 More concerted efforts should be made by short-term insurers to provide comprehensive 
information in order to effectively identify MO patterns. The more information is 
collected on MO, the easier it is to identify irregularities and trends, for example, 
dishonest claims. 
 Forensic investigators need to have a proper understanding of the subject and criminals’ 
behaviour in order to identify MO patterns. 
 The implementation of a database containing MO information can be used during 
underwriting and claims processing to identify and link policies and claims to fraudsters 
and syndicates. 
 Insurers should note the importance of capturing detailed and complete MO-related 
information to assist in enhancing controls within the organisation and preventing fraud 
from occurring. 
 MO information can be integrated into underwriting and claims processes, which will 
help to underwrite new policies properly and segment and flag high-risk claims. 
 If data are captured correctly and shared amongst the industry role players, fraudsters 
can be identified and irregularities can be highlighted at policy acceptance stage. 
 Once fraudsters become aware of the unique identifier that will be used to expose them, 
they learn from each other, adapt fast or upskill themselves so that they remain 
undetected. Therefore, MO information is very valuable in detecting future fraudulent 
claims. 
 The researcher recommends the following MO matrix (as per Table 3.1 below) 
applicable to short-term insurance claims should be implemented and completed when 
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investigating a cluster of similar claims. Once a data set is completed, the matrix should 
be stored electronically and be accessible to all forensic investigators working in the 
department. 
Table 3.1: Short-term insurance fraud modus operandi matrix 
INFORMATION Incident 1 Incident 2 Incident 3 
Policy number       
Company name        
Policy holder       
Co-insured       
ID number       
Postal address       
Address        
Contact number – landline       
Contact number – cell phone       
Email address       
Bank account – debit order       
Bank account – claims payment        
Inception date       
Item inception date       
Cancellation date       
Claim number       
Date of claims report       
Date and time of loss       
Description of loss       
Scene of incident       
Item description       
Registration/serial number       
Ownership information       
Driver information       
A/R number       
O/b number       
CAS number       
Method of communication        
Quotes – supplier details       
Quotes – number        
Invoice – supplier details       
Invoice – number       
Proof of ownership       
Towing operator’s details       
Third-party details       
Finance House info        
Panel beater       
Assessor       
Broker details       
Witness details       
Settlement – repair, replace, cash       
Duplicate insurance       
Other       
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
The research design and methodology applied in this study allowed the researcher to adequately 
address the research aim, purpose of the research and the research question: What is the value 
of applying modus operandi information as a forensic investigation method in the investigation 
of short-term insurance fraud? The researcher examined the value of MO information in the 
investigation of short-term insurance fraud; this was illustrated by means of a comprehensive 
literature review, which was supplemented by the integration of empirical evidence obtained 
from semi-structured interviews. 
MO has been successfully utilised globally as an investigative tool to link cases and identify 
common perpetrators responsible for committing crimes such as housebreaking, rape and 
murder. To increase the success of short-term insurance fraud investigations and decrease the 
financial losses attributed to fraud suffered by the short-term insurance industry, it is extremely 
important for forensic investigators to familiarise themselves with the benefits of effectively 
using MO information during the investigation of short-term insurance fraud. 
This study should be able to persuade the short-term insurance industry that the application of 
MO information as a forensic investigation method will be extremely valuable in detecting, 
preventing and responding to incidents of fraud. Should the relevant role players consider the 
implementation of the recommendations made in this study, the value and benefits of MO 
information in fraud investigations could be measured amongst all short-term insurers. The 
researcher has dedicated about 16 years of her life to investigation and from experience is 
convinced that MO is a very valuable investigation tool in addressing short-term insurance 
fraud. 
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